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Intermediaries and destination reputations: Explaining flows of skilled 
migration 
Abstract 
Governments have increasingly commercialised their migration services, which has fuelled a 
mushrooming migration industry creating a ripe context for the central role of migration intermediaries. 
It is therefore timely to explore the new actors responsible for shaping contemporary flows of skilled 
migration.  Drawing on the work of existing studies and a wide variety of secondary data, we argue that 
the range of intermediaries who have emerged as a result of the commercialisation process, have been 
poorly understood in the skilled migration and migration industries literatures.  Discussion of these 
actors sheds important theoretical light on how intermediaries, destination reputations and skilled 
migration flows intersect.  Accordingly, we outline six propositions that identify the interconnected 
relationship between migration intermediaries, reputation and skilled migration flows.   
Keywords 
Skilled migration flows; Intermediaries; Destination reputations; Social networks; Migration 
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Introduction 
The commercialisation of migration services has led to a proliferation of non-state actors and there has 
been a subsequent growth of literature on the so called ‘migration industries’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen and 
Nyberg Sørensen, 2013, Findlay et al., 2013; Cranston, 2014, 2016; Cranston et al., in press).  At the 
same time, there has been a lack of discussion of skilled migration flows, despite the fact that they 
represent an important talent pool for countries (Harvey, 2014; Silvanto et al., 2015). The migration 
literature identifies the factors that shape migration decisions, by examining different scales of analysis 
(e.g. immigration policy at the macro level; network contacts at the meso level and individual decisions 
at the micro scale).  Social network theory has been an important framework to understand how these 
networks connect individuals at the micro level to immigration policies at the macro level and to job 
opportunities and integration experiences at the meso level (Lindquist et al., 2010).  However, 
surprisingly there has been little consideration in the migration industries literature of social networks 
or the interconnecting factors at the macro, meso and micro levels which influence skilled migration 
flows. 
To date, there has been limited research on how intermediaries shape the flows of skilled migrants, 
reinforcing and reproducing the commercial interests within the migration industries.  Skilled migrant 
intermediaries are actors operating at the intersection between skilled migrants and the destination or 
origin country (Groutsis et al., 2015; van den Broek et al., 2016).  They are similar to what the 
international labour organisation (ILO) refer to as a ‘triangular employment relationship’ when the 
intermediary (rather than the employer) engages directly with the migrant (ILO, 2005).  These 
intermediaries are also referred to as ‘brokers’, ‘middlemen’ and ‘autonomous enterprises’, and 
represent an essential part of the migration industries in the global labour market.  There has also been 
little analysis of how intermediaries service skilled migrants (cf. Groutsis et al., 2015; van den Broek et 
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al., 2016) and how the migration industry impacts on migration patterns and networks (Gammeltoft-
Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen, 2013; Spaan and Van Naerssen, this volume).  Given changes to both the 
scale of skilled migration and the nature of intermediaries, it is timely to analyse how intermediaries 
impact on skilled migration flows.  One of the contributions of this paper is to highlight the variety of 
intermediaries beyond those who are already well-known in the skilled migration industries literature 
such as migration, recruitment and global mobility firms (Findlay et al., 2013; Cranston, 2016; McCollum 
and Findlay, in press) to provide a broader understanding of how these disparate actors are impacting 
on skilled migration flows.   
A second important contribution of the paper is to show that different forms of destination reputations, 
which are often addressed in isolation such as country reputations, city reputations and organisational 
reputations, influence skilled migration flows in different and salient ways.  While there have been many 
attempts to define reputation (Fombrun, 1996, 2012; Walker, 2010), this research develops the 
important work of Fombrun (2012) and Walker (2010) to define reputation as the collective positive or 
negative assessment of destinations among skilled migrants.  In addition to our narrow understanding of 
intermediaries, there is arguably even less understanding of how reputation impacts on skilled migration 
flows.  This paper provides clarity around how destination reputations impact on skilled migration flows.   
Given the gaps in our understanding from the migration industries literature on social networks, 
intermediaries, skilled migration flows and reputation, the paper focuses on addressing this neglect 
while also connecting these different strands of literature. 
Skilled migration flows and social networks 
There has been a surge of cross-disciplinary interest in skilled migrants in the last decade (Harvey, 2011; 
van Riemsdijk, 2014).  The focus on skilled migration in the literature has been matched by a growth of 
coverage in the media, government and supranational policies and reports as well as in the business 
press (Boxell, 2010; Chaloff, and Lemaître, 2009; The Economist, 2010; PwC, 2010).  There are many 
definitions of skilled migrant and it is not our intention to problematise existing definitions (see Boucher 
and Cerna, 2014; Findlay and Cranston, 2015).  Instead, we follow Andresen et al. (2014: 2307), and use 
the term skilled migration broadly to encompass a wide spectrum of workers, including intra self-
initiated expatriates (e.g. individuals looking for global opportunities through their existing 
organisational employers), inter self-initiated expatriates (e.g. dependent workers such as foreign 
recruits and independent workers such as entrepreneurs), assigned expatriates (e.g. traditional 
organisational expatriates) and drawn expatriates (e.g. top global executives approached by 
organisations).  
The literature on skilled migration has argued that flows of skilled migration are driven by 
considerations at the macro, meso and micro level.  At the macro-(country) level, factors such as the 
political, economic and legal climate may determine whether people stay in their home country or move 
to a destination country (Massey et al., 1993; Regets, 2001).  Immigration policy and the allocation of 
particular visas, for example, will impact upon the volume of skilled migrants.  At the meso-level, there 
is a wealth of research on how various forms of individual and organisational networks affect migration 
decisions (Vertovec, 2002; Harvey, 2011).  For instance, migrant networks have historically influenced 
the migration flows of skilled migrants.  At the micro-level, there is extensive research on individual 
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migration decisions, including but not limited to the importance of economic, professional, political and 
environmental factors (Borjas, 1999; Hardill and Macdonald, 2000).  Skilled migrants, for example, may 
move based on their predictions of where they can maximise their return in the labour market or where 
they can increase their quality of life.  What is absent, however, is an explanation of flows of migration 
which cross-sects the macro, meso and micro-level (de Haas, 2010) in what Xiang (2012: 68) describes as 
the “complex structure of the middle ground”.  The literature on migrant social networks has responded 
by adopting a multi-level analysis to bridge macro and micro level approaches to migration (Lindquist et 
al., 2010), which has been somewhat absent from the migration industries literature.   
Although the migration industries literature highlights new actors in the migration process (Gammeltoft-
Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen, 2013), there has been little exploration of new social networks which 
emerge as a result of these nascent actors, despite an extensive literature on social networks and 
migration flows (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes, 2003).  Massey et al. (1993: 448) argue that migrant 
networks are the social ties that connect potential and former migrants as well as non-migrants in 
sending and destination countries through family, friendship, ethnic origin and workplace ties.  Social 
networks are important for facilitating flows of skilled migration because the contacts migrants have 
with different actors provide them with valuable information about their likely experiences of moving to 
another country (de Haas, 2010) and therefore reduce the cost burden of migration.  They are also the 
means by which workers in sending countries find work in destination countries through connections to 
various forms of intermediaries (Pittman, 2016), which highlights the links between social networks and 
commercially driven migration intermediaries.  Ryan (2015) shows the complexity surrounding skilled 
Irish migrants forming trusted networks in Britain, which significantly impacts upon their experiences of 
mobility.  The above literature highlights that social networks, if available, are important for helping 
skilled migrants to both migrate and integrate into destination countries. 
Skilled migrant intermediaries 
Turning attention to intermediaries and how they shape migration flows shifts the starting point of 
migration decision making from social networks to intermediary relations (Lindquist et al., 2012; 
Groutsis et al., 2015; van den Broek et al., 2016).  While there is an established literature on how social 
networks impact the flow of skilled migrants, we know little about new forms of social networks that 
have emerged between skilled migrants and various intermediaries.  From the perspective of skilled 
migrants, there has been an absence of detailed labour market information around the practicalities and 
realities of immigrating to destination countries.  This information vacuum stymies a developed 
understanding of new market opportunities for intermediaries and what the reputational implications of 
that may be for migration destinations. 
Despite a growing literature on skilled migration and labour market intermediaries (Forde and 
MacKenzie, 2010; Lindquist et al., 2012), there has been an absence of discussion of what we refer to as 
‘skilled migrant intermediaries’.  These intermediaries use social networks to connect skilled migrants in 
sending countries, provide them with information and services related to labour market opportunities, 
and mediate between migrants, client organisations and sending and destination countries at critical 
stages of the migration process (Lindquist et al., 2012; Xiang, 2012).  There is a ‘grapevine of 
intermediaries’ (Krissman, 2005: 6) and a ‘complex articulation of individuals, associations, and 
organizations’ (Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 319), which has intensified the increasingly dependent 
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relationship between migrants and intermediaries (Groutsis et al., 2016).  Consequently, there is a need 
for ‘middle-level theory’ and ‘meso-scale understanding’ (Findlay and Li, 1998: 682, 683), particularly in 
the context of the migration industries, so that we can better understand this complex web of 
relationships (Xiang, 2012) and their impact on flows of skilled migration. 
Given the changing nature of international migration, which is marked by a rise in skilled mobility and a 
demand-driven approach to attracting such migrants (Saxenian, 2006; Harvey, 2011), it is important to 
understand who these different skilled migrant intermediaries are and how they affect skilled migration 
flows through social networks, particularly given the proliferation of new forms of online and social 
media.  Despite some emerging literature on reputation and skilled migration (Harvey and Groutsis, 
2015), there is a scarcity of understanding around how intermediaries influence and are influenced by 
destination reputation among skilled migrants, and the implication this has on skilled migration flows.  
This represents a further body of literature and provides important insights for the migration industries 
which has given less focus to skilled migration flows. 
….. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
….. 
Reputation  
While absent from the migration industries literature, there is an extensive literature on reputation that 
has been applied in the context of organisations.  Fombrun and Shanley (1990) argue that the 
reputation of organisations will impact upon the job and career choices of potential employees.  For 
example, Glückler (2007) argues that management consulting firms may win new client work to further 
build their reputations, which has implications for attracting both clients and employees.  Aula and 
Harmaakorpi (2008) established that firms are more attracted to locating in regions which are strongly 
networked and which hold high levels of social capital.  Building on this literature is the intersection of 
migration and mobility.  Harvey and Groutsis (2015), for example, have argued that skilled migrants are 
both influenced by origin and destination country reputations when making migration decisions, but are 
also producers of the reputation of origin and destination countries, based on their direct experiences, 
which shapes their own perceptions as well as those of other skilled workers.  This is important because 
it provides a new theoretical lens to understand skilled migration flows to destination countries. 
We build on the reputation literature and ask how flows of skilled migration are shaped by destination 
reputations.  We deliberately use the phrase ‘destination reputations’ rather than ‘destination country 
reputations’ because we recognise that the country may not be the only or the most salient unit of 
analysis in the context of reputation among skilled migrants.  Destination reputation is arguably 
important in the context of understanding flows of skilled migration because how countries, cities 
and/or organisations are perceived will determine mobility decisions among skilled migrants.  Skilled 
migrants often have limited experience and/or information about moving to destinations and in such 
instances they use reputation as a proxy for judging their likely experience of moving to a destination.   
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As such, social networks, skilled migrant intermediaries and reputation should be important 
components of existing theories of skilled migration flows, and yet these themes are not well-
understood or connected in the migration industries literature.  This leads to a series of propositions 
that relate to the following research question: 
How do migration intermediaries, destination reputations and skilled migration flows interact, 
reinforce and reproduce the migration industry? 
Drawing-upon a wide range of examples, we outline six propositions, which explore the two-way 
interaction between intermediaries, destination reputations among skilled migrants and depictions of 
skilled migration flows to destinations (see Figure 1).  We believe that this provides a more holistic 
understanding of skilled migration flows and represents a significant contribution to both the skilled 
migration and the migration industries literatures. 
….. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
….. 
Proposition 1: The activities of skilled migrant intermediaries impact on the reputation 
of destinations among skilled migrants. 
An emerging body of labour market research highlights the centrality of intermediaries such as 
recruitment agencies across a range of countries and economic sectors (Samaluk, 2016).  While valuable 
for understanding the nature of different labour market sectors, by overlooking how these 
intermediaries may shape the reputation of destinations among skilled migrants (Coe et al., 2010; 
Findlay et al., 2013), we miss important implications on the talent pipeline of destinations.  A sector 
where one type of intermediary: recruitment agents, has become commonplace for placing skilled 
migrants in work, is in healthcare where employers need to quickly fill shortages with skilled migrants 
(Connell and Stilwell, 2006).  While the state has significant influence here, as detailed further on in our 
discussion, private sector employers are increasingly playing a significant role in the recruitment of 
skilled labour through employer-sponsored programs.  In Canada, for example, the Federal Skilled 
Worker Program assesses skilled migrants on the basis of their education, work experience and 
knowledge of English and French.  Canadian employers can significantly improve the likelihood of a 
potential skilled migrant having their application approved through making them a job offer in a skilled 
occupation (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012).  These developments have underscored the 
proliferation of individual private recruitment firms, temporary staffing and migration agents (Connell 
and Stilwell, 2006; Coe et al., 2009; Cangiano and Walsh, 2014; McCollum and Findlay, in press) and the 
internationalisation of labour markets as employers struggle to source talent from local and national 
labour pools.  Such an emphasis on the demand side of skilled (migrant) labour, which is apparent 
throughout OECD member nations (OECD, 2008), highlights the economic incentive for recruitment 
agents to act as conduits for both domestic employers and skilled migrants abroad. 
The transactional relationship between intermediaries and skilled migrants, is an outcome of macro-
level transitions from the ‘hollowing out’ of government to network governance models (Groutsis et al., 
2015). As a consequence, intermediaries are strategically placed to shape the reputation of destination 
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countries among skilled migrants, which historically would have been managed more directly by 
national governments.  The challenge is if promises are made by intermediaries, but not fulfilled at the 
point of migration and employment then this will disengage skilled migrants.  For instance, more than 
‘1.3 million college-educated immigrants are unemployed or working in unskilled jobs such as 
dishwashers, security guards, and taxi drivers-representing one of every five highly skilled immigrants in 
the US labor force’ (Batalova and Fix, 2008: 1).  If intermediaries are channelling skilled migrants into 
destination countries where they subsequently cannot find work commensurate with their skills and 
training then this will have a negative impact on the reputation of destinations (and intermediaries) 
among skilled migrants.  
One type of recruitment agency that typically enables the mobility of skilled workers at the high end of 
the labour market is executive search firms (Boyle et al., 1996) or ‘elite labour market intermediaries’ 
(Faulconbridge et al., 2008).  Examples of these firms include Egon Zehnder, Korn Ferry and Spencer 
Stuart, who operate on a global scale, connecting applicants who hold and/or are looking to move into 
senior management positions.  Typically, the search for such highly skilled workers operates across 
international borders and frequently leads to the global mobility of workers, particularly in areas where 
certain leadership and technical skills are not readily available in the destination country.  These types of 
intermediaries rely on very close social networks between the client organisation and the executive 
search firm as well as between the potential candidates and the executive search firms.  Because many 
high level executive appointments receive significant media coverage (e.g. Mark Carney, the Governor 
of the Bank of England moving from Canada to the UK), the success or failure of such appointments, 
which can be considerably costly for clients of executive search firms, will heighten the reputational 
benefits or deficits for destinations due to the professional and personal networks of skilled migrants. 
Proposition 2: The reputation of destinations among skilled migrants impact on the 
activities of skilled migrant intermediaries. 
Counter-intuitively, government departments also act as intermediaries for skilled migrants because 
their policies and communication impact upon migration decisions and behaviour.  However, 
marketisation of government has “fragmented service delivery, multiplied networks and diversified 
membership of those networks” (Rhodes, 2007: 1248), at a time when migration is a highly emotive 
public discourse.  Public concerns around immigration, for example, was at the centre of the outcome of 
the UK’s referendum vote in June of 2016, which has major repercussions for skilled migration flows to 
and from the UK within the European Union.  Governments in the destination country also implement 
policies that determine how many and what types of skilled migrants are able to enter a country, and 
under what conditions.  They collate skills shortages lists, actively market professional vacancies and 
hold expo events abroad to target workers with particular skills.  In addition, they set the conditions for 
particular types of relationships between migrants, employers and labour markets (Rodriguez, 2009).  
This has significant repercussions for employers who are looking to employ skilled migrants and for 
skilled migrants, many of who are looking to move for work purposes.  Sporton’s (2013) research on 
Eastern European migration finds how international recruitment agents are able to identify demand for 
workers in particular under-performing local labour markets, while Bludau’s (2011) research finds that 
recruitment firms in the Czech Republic provide a supply of skilled migrant nurses, who are seeking 
employment abroad.  The destination reputations among skilled migrants impacts on the demand for 
talent from employers and the potential supply of talent from skilled migrants interested in moving, 
both of which influence the activities of intermediaries.   
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The Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong has made many public statements and supported the 
recruitment of professionals and business workers through government policy as part of a strategy of 
growing the city-state’s knowledge-based economy (Ho, 2011).  These policies create a positive 
reputation among potential skilled migrants around the value the Singaporean government places on 
their human capital.  This has meant that there are a variety of intermediaries, including but not limited 
to migration and recruitment agents, who enable skilled migration flows into Singapore.  This is in stark 
contrast with rhetoric in the U.S. where there have been discussions of a reduction in the country’s H-1B 
visa allocation, culminating in high-profile business leaders such as Microsoft’s Chairman Bill Gates 
(Broache, 2008) and News Corporation’s Executive Chairman Rupert Murdoch (Murdoch, 2014) warning 
of the damage that this could cause to the country’s competitiveness because skilled migrants would be 
put off applying for visas and less would be admitted each year.  Here, restrictive immigration policies 
around the country’s skilled H-1B visa will reduce the capacity of different intermediaries such as 
migration agents to operate.  This argument has knock-on effects for other kinds of skilled workers 
because restrictive and bureaucratic visa requirements impact on the flow of tourists, business workers 
and temporary migrants (The Economist, 2016). 
Proposition 3: The activities of skilled migrant intermediaries impact on skilled 
migration flows. 
A number of organisations in the destination country attempt to adopt a direct approach to recruiting 
skilled migrants (Pittman, 2016).  Multinational corporations with offices in overseas locations are 
particularly well placed to do this because they can transfer employees to other locations as assigned 
expatriates (Salt, 1992).  While some organisations are successful at convincing skilled migrants directly 
of the benefits of living and working in a destination, the engagement of particular intermediaries is not 
even across different migrant groups.  Khoo et al. (2005), for instance, found that 83% of Korean skilled 
migrants in Australia preferred to use a migration agent, compared to only 23% of German skilled 
migrants.  They found that Asian migrants in particular used agents because they felt that they might 
attain ‘a high rate of approval’ which facilitates their ability to gain access to the Australian labour 
market (Khoo et al., 2005: 30).  Havergal (2015) reports that there has been an unprecedented growth 
of agents commissioned by universities in the UK to recruit non-EU students, implying that these 
intermediaries are important for influencing the flow of skilled migrants into the UK. 
Organisations that are sourcing executive and specialist roles often do not have the internal expertise 
and capacity to source this talent and therefore frequently utilise the services of executive search firms 
(Faulconbridge et al., 2009), as discussed above.  Many medium and large organisations are outsourcing 
recruitment and selection work to other intermediaries such as recruitment and migration agents for 
efficiency and competitive purposes so that they can focus their resources on their core services.  
Importantly, this is not simply a labour market intermediary argument of organisations outsourcing 
services to a specialist service provider.  They are also relying on these intermediaries to convince 
potential talent, many of whom are skilled migrants, of the positive benefits of living and working in a 
particular country.  Hence, they play a valuable role in shaping the destination reputation for skilled 
migrants.  
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Proposition 4: Skilled migration flows impact on the activities of skilled migrant 
intermediaries. 
Approximately half of overseas-qualified nurses in the UK gain posts through specialist migration agents, 
with the remainder recruited directly through individual hospitals, which have an international profile 
and points of overseas contacts (Hardill and Macdonald, 2000).  At the time of Hardill and MacDonald’s 
(2000) study, a fee of £2,000 was paid for an agent’s service and typically employees would be offered a 
one-year contract.  This use of migration agents in the healthcare sector is a direct response to high 
market demand for skilled migrants and the knowledge and image of such opportunities among this 
group in different parts of the world.  
Migration agents play an important intermediation role for overseas students looking to enter the 
higher education market (Collins, 2012).  Although international students are not always defined under 
the category of skilled migrants, they are in the process of becoming skilled migrants through their 
education and training.  A report by the Observatory on Borderless Higher Education (2014) found that 
32% of first year international students at 48 universities in the three largest destination countries (the 
US, UK and Australia) used a migration or recruitment agent: a 10% increase in the last five years.  As 
such, intermediaries are shaping skilled migration flows in powerful ways, channelling students into 
particular tertiary institutions in certain countries (see Beech this volume).  
Proposition 5: The reputation of destinations among skilled migrants impact on skilled 
migration flows. 
There has been a surge of reputational rankings in the last decade.  One of the conceptual challenges of 
these rankings in the context of skilled migration flows is that there is a disconnect between different 
forms of reputation such as corporate reputations, country reputations and city reputations.  Yet, we 
suggest below that they all impact on skilled migration flows in different and salient ways.  Many 
rankings have focused on the reputations of organisations across different sectors such as Fortune’s 
Most Admired Companies (Fortune, 2015), or have focused on one sector in particular such as the Times 
Higher Education World University Rankings (2015).  Notwithstanding the considerable methodological 
limitations of measuring reputation, these formal and informal reputation benchmarks enable reputable 
firms to accrue significant benefits from high rankings, including the ability to attract and retain talent 
(Fombrun, 1996).  Hence, we suggest that reputation is important for attracting skilled migrants, who 
are an important part of an organisation’s talent pool.  Samsung, for example, has successfully sourced 
high quality software engineers to move from India to South Korea because of the company’s high 
reputation (Harvey and Groutsis, 2015).  Saxenian (2006) has documented a similar phenomenon in the 
US with large volumes of skilled migrants in the ICT sector moving to Silicon Valley because of the 
presence of nearby elite universities (e.g. Stanford and UC Berkeley) and IT firms (e.g. Apple and 
Google).  Samaluk (2016) has found that workers are attracted to move to particular places (often 
misguidedly) because their reputations may grant them particular social capital or economic returns.  In 
short, organisational reputation has a strong influence on the mobility of talent, including but not 
limited to skilled migrants. 
Reputation is also important at a national and regional level and there are a growing number of high 
profile and widely distributed survey rankings, which also influence skilled migration.  HSBC’s Expat 
Explorer Survey (2014), for instance, commissioned YouGov to survey over 9,000 expatriates in more 
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than 100 countries, asking questions on economics, work and social experiences, and raising children.  
The InterNations (2014) annual survey targets thousands of expatriates and skilled migrants, and it 
highlights the best and worst places to live, with questions focusing on quality of life, ease of settling in, 
working abroad, family life (if applicable), personal finance and general satisfaction.  The experiences of 
skilled migrants living abroad can vary markedly not only between but also within countries, and there 
are a number of influential surveys of global cities.  The Economist’s (2014) annual liveability survey 
presents safety and environmental factors in 140 global cities.  Similarly, Mercer’s (2015) quality of living 
survey looks at a range of factors, including climate, disease, sanitation standards, ease of 
communication, the political and social environment, and crime.   
The above reputational rankings (corporate, country and city) are important because they reach a wide, 
skilled and influential audience, providing skilled migrants with information about moving to potential 
destinations.  Yet, they have not been recognised in the skilled migration or migration industries 
literatures as having an impact upon skilled migration decisions.  Importantly, these ranking agents will 
portray positive, negative or sometimes ambivalent representations of different places, which will 
influence skilled migration flows because skilled migrants will typically consider the pros and cons of 
living in multiple destinations.  The implication is there are multiple forms of reputation, all of which act 
in tandem rather than in isolation when skilled migrants make migration decisions.  These operate 
together because in reality skilled migrants will use all the information available to them, which entails 
aggregating these reputations, rather than evaluating them individually.  This does not mean that all 
reputations are treated equally because skilled migrants will weigh factors differently depending on the 
degree of importance to them.   
Proposition 6: Skilled migration flows impact on destination reputations among skilled 
migrants. 
There is an extensive literature on the effect that migrant networks have on shaping decisions to 
migrate to a particular destination country (Massey et al., 1993; Goss and Lindquist, 1995).  Chacko 
(2007) found that many Indian professionals moved to the US because of the positive stories they had 
heard from skilled migrants who had successfully moved.  Surprisingly, there has been relatively little 
understanding of how different experiences of moving to destination countries may impact upon the 
destination reputation among skilled migrants.  Much of the literature on skilled migrants has 
overlooked the impact of media, online content and social media in shaping destination reputation for 
skilled migration flows.  Montgomery (2008) is one of the few exceptions in her discussion of Indian and 
Taiwanese engineers using their social ties with fellow alumni by e-mail to share their perceptions of 
destination country experiences.  With increasing advancements in IT and the prevalence with which 
people are engaging with different forms of media, it is not surprising that there has been rapid growth 
in informal migrant intermediaries such as online expatriate forums and social media groups.  American 
Expats in the UK, for example, is an online forum for American expatriates planning to move to the UK, 
or for those who have already moved to the country, to discuss a range of topics with other members 
such as migration and relocation issues, finding work, health care, schooling as well as participating in 
sports and social activities (American Expats in the UK, 2011).  Such online resources provide a range of 
migration information from skilled migrants or from skilled migration experts, which shape the 
destination reputations among potential skilled migrants.  However, there has been a dearth of research 
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or media coverage of how information shared through such channels can explicitly and implicitly shape 
destination reputations among skilled migrants. 
To date, there has been very little research conducted on how information on skilled migration emerges 
and is shared on online forums or different media, and in particular social media (e.g. SnapChat, 
Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn), which in turn impacts on the destination reputations among skilled 
migrants.  This is a major oversight because we know in social and business contexts, such forums can 
play a valuable role in communicating reputations (Jøsang et al., 2007).  So it would be reasonable to 
predict that such online forums where migratory experiences are shared play an important role in 
shaping destination reputations among skilled migrants.   
Discussion 
Based on existing studies and a wide range of secondary data, we have formulated six propositions that 
seek to better understand flows of skilled migration today.  Returning to our research question, we 
argue that there are important interaction effects between skilled migrant intermediaries, destination 
reputations among skilled migrants, and skilled migration flows.  This is an important contribution to the 
migration industries literature which has hitherto given less attention to skilled migration flows and 
social networks which cut across different scales of analysis, or to the reputational effects of these 
interactions.  We also argue that there is a growing group of intermediaries who are influencing the 
migration flows of skilled migrants. The implication is that national governments may lose both control 
and responsibility of their reputation among skilled migrants, particularly if such intermediaries are 
invisible (Xiang, 2012).  This is salient given our multidimensional argument of reputation which 
incorporates not one but multiple forms of reputation and cross sects at the macro, meso and micro 
levels. 
The literature on social networks has an important role to play in these propositions because social 
networks influence each relationship.  In particular, important information is exchanged between skilled 
migrants and intermediaries, which influences destination reputations and ultimately flows of skilled 
migrants.  For example, the social ties between intermediaries and skilled migrants will impact upon the 
destination reputations among skilled migrants through information exchanged between both groups 
(proposition 1).  Such networks create and shape destination reputations among skilled migrants.  
However, we recognise that social networks are neither the same, nor operate in a uniform way in 
relation to the six propositions (see also Curran and Rivero-Fuentes, 2003). 
There is only partial evidence from the migration industries literature on the different types of skilled 
migrant intermediaries and one of the contributions of this paper is to highlight the broad ranging 
nature of intermediaries beyond the well-known influence of migration and recruitment agents.  There 
is also little analysis of how intermediaries shape the destination reputations among skilled migrants, or 
how the reputations of destinations among skilled migrants impact on the activities of intermediaries 
(proposition 2).  This is another important contribution of this paper because current theories of skilled 
migration have not adequately captured the importance of intermediaries despite their prevalence in 
the skilled migration labour market, nor have they captured the impact of social networks between 
intermediaries and skilled migrants.  This is at the very time that the outsourcing of migration and its 
commercialisation has become more prevalent, meaning that traditional network ties with government 
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have become fragmented (Rhodes, 2007), attracting new intermediaries into the field (Lindquist et al., 
2012; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen, 2013; Groutsis et al., 2015; van den Broek et al., 2016).  
It is these visible and invisible actors and the interactions that they are forging that are reinforcing and 
reproducing the migration industry.  It is timely to understand the different social ties that exist 
between intermediaries and skilled migrants, not least because it impacts upon destination reputations 
among skilled migrants. 
Figure 1 shows the complex nature in which networks intersect with skilled migrant intermediaries and 
the destination reputations among skilled migrants.  We suggest that there is no clear cause/effect 
binary between these dimensions, but instead they are bound by mutual but by no means equal 
interdependencies.  The behaviour of skilled migrant intermediaries will impact upon the destination 
reputation and skilled migration flows.  This is a process facilitated by the information that is transferred 
from intermediaries to potential skilled migrants (proposition 3).  At the same time, the perceptions of 
skilled migration flows will affect the demand for intermediaries and therefore their subsequent 
activities (proposition 4). 
Social networks are critical because information is disseminated through information channels, which 
can be online (e.g. mass media, popular media, social media or gaming), or offline (e.g. through face-to-
face interaction).  Significantly, because new intermediaries and technologies have emerged in the last 
decade, many new offline and online social networks between skilled migrants and intermediaries have 
arisen which have yet to be explored in the migration industries literature.  The destination reputations 
among skilled migrants are shared through social networks, which will impact upon the skilled migration 
flows to destination countries (proposition 5).  Intermediaries can shape destination reputations among 
skilled migrants in a positive way and therefore constitute ‘reputation builders’ for countries, or in a 
negative way as ‘reputation damagers’ (Harvey and Groutsis, 2015b).  This represents both an 
opportunity and a risk for destination countries and therefore cannot be ignored because of the direct 
impact of reputation on flows of skilled migration.  At the same time, prior experiences of moving to 
destination countries also shape migration flows, with migrants following each other along the ‘beaten 
track’ (de Haas, 2010: 1589).  This will impact on destination reputations among skilled migrants through 
experiences of skilled migration flows to destinations (proposition 6).   
Conclusions and Future research 
This paper has argued that the relationship between skilled migrant intermediaries and destination 
reputations among skilled is central for understanding today’s flows of skilled migrants.  We have 
highlighted that intermediaries are common and more wide-ranging than the literature has 
acknowledged and comprise a key part of the actors in the migration industry, which to date has 
provided less analysis of skilled migration flows and new forms of social networks.  According to 
Cangiano and Walsh (2014), employers in the UK and Ireland are using intermediaries because of the 
excessive burden of keeping up-to-date with immigration regulation, but it is less clear how aware 
various organisations and migrants are of the extent to which intermediaries are, or should be, 
regulated.  Arguably increased regulation of various forms of intermediaries will help to reduce 
misconduct towards skilled migrants and also ensure that governments and organisations are more 
aware of how these actors shape the flows of skilled migrants (see Cranston this volume for an 
example).  A failure to acknowledge and analyse the function of intermediaries will entrench 
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misunderstanding of a major and disparate stakeholder group who are increasingly shaping skilled 
migration flows today.   
At present, we do not know whether the experience for skilled migrants has changed in light of these 
new forms of intermediaries, either positively or negatively.  Hence, we encourage scholars to pursue 
more fine-grained research into the different intermediaries that exist, including those discussed above 
as well as others (e.g. NGOs and trade unions).  We need to understand the activities of these various 
intermediaries and ascertain what the reputational outcomes are.  This will affect not only future flows 
of skilled migrants, but also future levels of business partnerships and investments, which are often 
harnessed through the social networks of skilled migrants (Saxenian, 2006). 
We have also argued that destination reputations among skilled migrants plays a major role in 
explaining flows of skilled migrants.  In particular, the destination reputations among skilled migrants 
will influence and be influenced by skilled migration flows to destinations by third parties and a 
multitude of intermediaries.  One aspect, which could be further developed, is that of reputation 
contagion, which we define as the means by which one form of reputation impacts upon another form 
of reputation, either positively or negatively.  If a group of skilled migrants, for instance, have 
encountered negative experiences with migration agents then this will not only impact upon the 
reputation of migration agents (intermediaries) at a local level, but also the reputation of the 
organisation (e.g. corporate reputation).  The logic for this is their experiences of work in the destination 
have also been tarnished because of their negative experiences of moving to another country (Harvey 
and Groutsis, 2015).  This ‘reputational spillover’ effect (Glückler, 2007) between the intermediary, 
organisation and country, can be a positive or a negative force and can be long term and enduring.  
However, we know very little about the interplay of various forms of reputation and what implications 
they have for flows of skilled migrants.  This is theoretically important because we need a holistic 
understanding of the impact of reputation, and practically important because there are arguably various 
actors who influence the flows of skilled migrants who interest groups such as NGOs, trade unions and 
the media are starting to question.  In addition, given that the perceptions of migrants are strongly 
shaped by their early experiences and can often be filled with unrealistic expectations (Bhattacharya 
and Schoppelrey, 2004), destination countries should pay particular attention to the experiences of 
early arrivals, which is difficult when many migration services are outsourced to third parties amid 
varying levels of regulation and monitoring.  This is a similar challenge that organisations face in other 
contexts when their reputation now depends not only on their own activities, but also on the activities 
of others (Tate et al., 2010; The Economist, 2014; Schapendonk, this issue). Arguably this makes them 
more vulnerable to the ‘reputation commons’ when all organisations suffer in a given sector when the 
actions of one organisation negatively impact upon the reputation of the industry as a whole (Barnett 
and King, 2008). 
This paper provides an important contribution to the migration industries literature by highlighting that 
a range of intermediaries and reputation are important for theorising flows of skilled migration today, 
particularly through different forms of social networks.  We also explain that intermediaries, reputation 
and skilled migration flows do not operate in isolation, but interact with one another, which provides a 
more holistic understanding of skilled migration flows.  We encourage scholars to deepen the empirical 
evidence of the relationship between intermediaries, reputation and skilled migration flows, and in 
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particular explore how social networks enable (or disable) these relationships.  Now is a timely moment 
to expand our research and analysis of these new actors and relationships, particularly given their 
relative invisibility in the migration industries literature. 
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Table 1: Examples of skilled migrant intermediaries 
Proposition  Type of skilled 
migrant 
intermediary 
Financial 
cost 
Examples Related references 
Proposition 1: The activities of 
skilled migrant intermediaries 
impact upon the reputation of 
destinations among skilled 
migrants. 
Recruitment 
agents 
High Manpower Inc; 
Employment 
Expos;  
Boyle et al., 1996; Buchan et al., 
2005; Connell and Stilwell, 2006; 
Coe et al., 2009; Findlay et al., 
2013; McCollum and Findlay, in 
press 
Proposition 2: The reputation of 
destinations among skilled 
migrants impact on the activities 
of skilled migrant 
intermediaries. 
Government Medium Department of 
Health; NHS; Kea 
New Zealand 
Goss and Lindquist, 1995; 
Larner, 2007;  Bludau, 2011;  
Sporton, 2013 
Proposition 3: The activities of 
skilled migrant intermediaries 
impact on skilled migration 
flows. 
Executive 
search firms 
Low Egon Zehnder; 
Korn Ferry; 
Spencer Stuart 
Salt, 1992; Findlay et al., 1998;  
Khoo et al., 2005;  Tasker and 
Jimenez, 2010; van den Broek et 
al., 2016 
Proposition 4: Skilled migration 
flows impact on the activities of 
skilled migrant intermediaries. 
Migration 
agents 
High Barlow & 
Company; 
Offshore 
migration agents 
Salt and Stein, 1997; Hardill and 
Macdonald, 2000; Buchan et al., 
2005; Coe et al., 2010; Connell, 
2010; Collins, 2012; Groutsis et 
al., 2015; Pittman, 2016 
Proposition 5: Destination 
reputations among skilled 
migrants impact on skilled 
migration flows. 
Ranking 
agents 
Low Mercer; The 
Economist 
HSBC, 2014; InterNations, 2014; 
The Economist, 2014; Harvey 
and Groutsis, 2015; Mercer, 
2015;  
Proposition 6: Skilled migration 
flows impact on destination 
reputations among skilled 
migrants. 
Online and 
offline forums 
and media 
sources 
Low American Expats 
in the UK; Forbes  
Chacko, 2007; Montgomery, 
2008; Moriarty et al., 2011; 
Harvey and Groutsis, 2015 
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Figure 1: Illustration of propositions mechanised through social networks 
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